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1‘Charlie Hebdo’ and the two sides of imitation
Elisabetta Brighi
Abstract [not to be included in the printed version]: In a 2009 paper, one of the 
neuroscientists instrumental to the discovery of ‘mirror neurons’, Vittorio Gallese, 
argued that there are always ‘two sides’ to mimesis – in and of itself mimesis is 
‘neither good nor bad’, argued Gallese, as it can be declined in terms of both 
conflictual or social behavior. While the great majority of work on imitation, 
contagion and suggestion (ICS) have emphasized imitation as either a vector of the 
social or as the building block of our social ontology, René Girard’s mimetic theory 
stands out as perhaps the approach most preoccupied with the ill effects of mimesis. 
Why is this so? Is Girard’s position an excessively one-sided and negative take on 
imitation? Drawing on the example of the 2015 ‘Charlie Hebdo’ terror attacks, in this 
chapter I argue, firstly, that imitation was central to both the violence perpetrated by 
attackers and the political and affective order that emerged around of the attacks. 
Thus, there is a fundamental ambivalence about the social and political workings of 
imitation. Secondly, I argue that behind Girard’s negative view of imitation lies an 
unacknowledged concern about the power of suggestion, and in particular affective 
suggestion. In fact, behind Girard’s growing concern about today’s escalating mimetic 
crisis there is a specific concern about the global and mimetic escalation of affects.
2One of the neuroscientists instrumental to the discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ in the early 
1990s commented a few years ago that there are always ‘two sides to mimesis’. In his 2009 
paper ‘The Two Sides of Mimesis: Girard’s Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation and 
Social Identification’, Vittorio Gallese argued that imitation is one of the most basic yet 
important functional mechanism of human beings. The fact that from birth we are wired to 
imitate means that through life we experience a radical openness to the Other which, amongst 
other things, constitutes the basis for the development of our subjectivity as intersubjectivity. 
In and of itself mimesis is ‘neither good nor bad’, argued Gallese – it is simply a core quality 
of the human and social condition:
Our constitutive openness to others, of which mimesis is one of the main expressions, 
can be declined both in terms of conflictual or social behaviour. It has the potential to 
lead not only to mimetic violence but also to the most creative aspects of human 
cognition’, particularly processes of ‘social identification, henceforth to sociality. 
(Gallese, 2009: 38, 21)
Imitation provides the scaffolding upon which the whole edifice of consciousness, society 
and politics are built – domains shot through with power, conflict, as well as cooperation and 
peace.
One of the most significant theoretical perspectives of the last half century to have 
foregrounded the centrality of imitation in the functioning of societies and cultures is René 
Girard’s mimetic theory. A maverick intellectual, elected in 2005 as one of les immortels of 
the Academie Franҫaise after decades of relative side-lining, Girard single-handedly 
fashioned a synthesis of anthropological, cultural and linguistic insights into a theory whose 
3main axiom concerns mimesis, and in particular the nature and workings of mimetic desire. 
The human ability to imitate, and to imitate especially the desire of Others, constitutes the 
fundamental structure of human existence, according to Girard. However, rather than as a 
neutral observation, Girard offered this insight as a warning. In fact, Girard’s entire œuvre is 
arguably preoccupied with showing the ill effects of imitation and illustrate the range of 
‘coping mechanisms’ that humans and societies developed to contain them. All conflict, 
according to Girard, originates in imitation because the nature of mimetic desire is always 
rivalrous and potentially violent.
Although sympathetic to mimetic theory, Gallese opened his paper with a cautionary 
remark: ‘one could in principle object against such apparently negative and one-sided view of 
mankind, in general, and of mimesis, in particular’ (2009: 21). The aim of this chapter is to 
take this remark and this objection seriously. The great majority of work on imitation, 
contagion and suggestion (ICS) have after all emphasized imitation as either a vector of the 
social or as the building block of our social ontology (Borch, 2018). The ‘ill effects’ with 
which these approaches have been preoccupied have typically related to the irrational 
behavior of the masses, the suggestible nature of the human psyche, or the speed and 
intensity of the contagious circulation of social mores, economic trends and human affects 
(Borch, 2012). Mimetic theory stands out as perhaps the only approach that has significantly 
raised the stakes, in that it has elevated imitation to the status not of ‘vector of sociality’, but 
rather of ultimate cause for the breakdown of such sociality. Why is this so?
In order to answer this question, the chapter will proceed in three stages. In the first 
section, I will briefly review the main themes of mimetic theory and the way in which they 
place imitation at the center of its conceptual palimpsest. The second section will also situate 
mimetic theory in the broader literature on ICS and argue that mimetic theory suffers from a 
curious selective amnesia – for an approach so interested in the question of origins and 
4historical development, mimetic theory has dismissed its links to nineteenth-century thinkers 
such as Gabriel Tarde, despite its fascination with fin de siècle philosophers, and preferred to 
build bridges with pre-modern approaches to imitation, arguably in an effort to foreground 
the link between imitation and violence. In the third section, the chapter will return to 
Gallese’s remarks about the double-sided nature of imitation and will attempt to throw light 
on the social and conflictual potential of imitation by turning to a highly imitative political 
phenomenon, namely terrorism, and in particular to 2015 ‘Charlie Hebdo’ terror attacks. My 
argument is that the attacks demonstrate, firstly, that imitation was central to both the 
violence perpetrated by attackers and the political and affective order that emerged around of 
the attacks. However, secondly, I argue that each of these sides of the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ affair 
contains a further set of mirrors – terrorist violence can be also thought of as a social activity 
driven by imitation, just as political order can be revealed to contain violent and rivalrous 
strains deriving from imitation. Mimesis therefore is two-sided not only in the sense that it 
can lead to social or conflictual behavior, but in the sense that traces of each are always 
contained in their opposite. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the future of 
democracy and political order in our hyper-mimetic age, characterized by the contagious 
spread of affect and the ever increasing dominance of mimetic forms of communication.
The mimesis of desire: Réne Girard on violence
After a rather peripatetic academic career and a self-imposed exile form France, in the 1960s 
Girard started to assemble the conceptual building blocks that would, over the span of two 
decades, coalesce around an innovative approach to imitation, i.e., mimetic theory (Girard, 
1996: 1–6). Despite his heterodox position with respect to the intellectual fashions of the day, 
Girard’s mimetic theory was in fact the result of the peculiar convergence of a number of 
influences: from Girard’s interest in Jacques Derrida’s use of the concept of pharmakon 
5(which would form the basis of Girard’s scapegoat mechanism) to Jacques Lacan’s 
understanding of the relation between desire and the Other, to Girard’s own interests in the 
great modern novelists and, ultimately, his Christian anthropology.
The fundamental insight behind Girard’s mimetic theory is that humans are mimetic 
animals, born with a fundamental openness and permeability to the Other (for an introduction 
to mimetic theory, see Palaver, 2013; and Brighi and Cerella, 2015). As imitative creatures, 
humans are driven by a tendency to imitation in many different ways and areas, but the most 
fundamental form of imitation is that which relates to desires, namely what we want. Human 
beings, Girard argues, are animals that desire – but they do not know what to desire: ‘the 
reason is that he [sic] desires being, something he himself lacks and which some other person 
seems to possess’ (Girard, 1972: 146). For this reason, individuals borrow their desires from 
the Other: our desires, then, are always mediated by the Other. According to Girard, our 
subjectivity and autonomy, if one can still use terms that reveal themselves to be problematic 
under the mimetic magnifying lens, emerge only through a complex matrix of imitative 
dynamics of which we are often unaware. Further, while we learn what to desire from Others, 
certain ‘Others’ are more important and formative than other ‘Others’. To those ‘significant 
others’, Girard gives the name of models: ‘We assume that desire is objective or subjective, 
but in reality it rests on a third party who gives value to the objects. The third party is usually 
the one who is closest, the neighbour’ (Girard, 2001: 9). 
Rather than dyadic or monistic, according to Girard, therefore, the fundamental 
structure of human relationships is triangular – connecting subjects, models and their mimetic 
object of desire in intimate ways. This triangular dynamic, however, ends up complicating the 
neat relationship between Self and Other, to the point of nesting a huge potential for violence 
in every significant relationship. As Girard explains, ‘If individuals tend to desire what their 
neighbours possess, or to desire what their neighbours even simply desire, this means that 
6rivalry exists at the very heart of human relations’ (Girard, 2001: 9). Love and admiration for 
our models can quickly turn into bitterness and rancor precisely because what they are, and 
what they desire, is necessarily also what we want. ‘The positive feelings resulting from the 
first identification – imitation, admiration, veneration – are fated to change into negative 
sentiments: despair, guilt, resentment’ (Girard, 1972: 182). Imitation shows its rivalrous and 
conflictual side when it manifests itself in its acquisitive, appropriative incarnation – when it 
structurally sets individuals on a collision course over the same object over which their 
desires mimetically converge.
Mimetic theory, then, does not conceptualize violence as a result of scarcity, egoism 
or self-affirmation. Rather, violence is purely processual, created by the mimetic 
entanglements of self and other: ‘violence is generated by this process, or rather violence is 
the process itself when two or more partners try to prevent one another from appropriating 
the object they all desire through physical or other means’ (Girard, 1976: 9). The inevitable 
rivalry that stems from the convergence of desires onto the same ‘object’ of desire constitutes 
the origin of all conflict – and the imitative spiral at the heart of this process is responsible for 
its escalation and spread, namely for contagion. As Girard states, mimetic desire is 
‘eminently contagious […]. It “catches” a nearby desire just as one would catch the plague or 
cholera, simply by contact with an infected person’ (1966: 96, 99). Contagion has the power 
to transform a community into a ‘mass of interchangeable beings. In this homogeneous mass 
the mimetic impulses no longer encounter any obstacle and spread at high speed’ (Girard, 
2001: 22). Crucially, the closer the rivals, the higher the possibility of violent contagion: 
when the rival becomes ‘part of the imitating subject’s world […], mediation is no longer 
external […]: Girard calls this phenomenon internal mediation’ (Palaver, 2013: 59). Further, 
when all differences between model and imitator disappear, the result is escalating rounds of 
7indifferentiation and a further intensification of mimetic tendencies. According to Girard, 
both instances lead to a mimetic crisis and the eruption of contagious violence.
In a bold interpretative wager, Girard hypothesizes that this particular predicament 
must have over time pushed primitive societies to adopt a mechanism able to contain the 
enormous potential for violence generated by imitation, either by channeling or ritualizing it. 
For Girard, this mechanism is the scapegoat. Confronted with a mimetic crisis and the 
possibility of ever escalating violence leading to annihilation, crowds are driven to channel 
violence toward a surrogate victim, or scapegoat, through which ‘the opposition of everyone 
against everyone else’ is ‘replaced by the opposition of all against one’ (Girard, 1987: 24). At 
once, through its sacrifice, the scapegoat becomes the object onto which the community 
discharges its mimetic violence as well as that which restores peace within the community. 
This murder therefore marks a moment of distinction, constructing meaning out of chaos and 
establishing the conditions for peace and violence – thus, it is responsible for the birth of 
culture. Furthermore, the scapegoat would be invested with sacrality, insofar as it ‘magically’ 
enabled the community to leave violence behind and return to peace. Thus, Girard argues, 
this mechanism would be the founding form of signification and the origin of culture and 
(ancient) religion, understood as ritualized form of sacrificial violence. Religion, according to 
Girard, is nothing but ‘an immense effort to keep the peace’ (Girard, 1987: 32) in conditions 
of imitation.
The parallel worlds of ICS and mimetic theory
For a theory that holds up such a probing mirror to imitation and that imputes such dire 
consequences to it, one would expect Girard to be well versed in the nineteenth-century 
literature on ICS, considering also how engaged Girard is precisely with some of the 
philosophers of that time, including Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Scheler (Palaver, 2013). 
8And yet, this is not the case. As Trevor Merrill has most recently noted, ‘Girard has flatly 
denied that [Gabriel] Tarde is one of his sources’ (Merrill, 2017: 457). In fact, it is not so 
much that Girard has dismissed Tarde’s influence. Rather, he has directly taken issue with the 
nineteenth-century ‘sociologists and psychologists of imitation’, accusing them of being 
intellectuals of the triumphant bourgeoisie of the time, whose optimism they channeled into 
an exclusively positive view of imitation understood as source of social harmony and 
progress’ (Girard, 1987: 8). Striking and unexpected resonances between mimetic theory and 
ICS become apparent, however, upon closer inspection.
As seen above, of the three concepts that coalesce at the end of the nineteenth century 
to inject life into the emerging fields of sociology and psychology – namely imitation, 
contagion and suggestion – Girard has a lot to say about the first two. While imitation 
functions as the Archimedean point of the entire edifice of mimetic theory, contagion is 
discussed widely across his work as a necessary consequence of mimetic desire and rivalry. 
In Things Hidden Since the Foundation of The World, for instance, Girard states that 
‘pathological contagion resembles mimetic contagion’ (Girard, 1987: 13). Twenty years 
earlier he was even more categorical when arguing that ‘metaphysical desire is eminently 
contagious’ (Girard, 1966: 96). The one concept which Girard hardly ever utilizes in his 
theories, however, is that of suggestion. And yet, traces of the language of suggestion can be 
found especially in the description of mimetic desire, which Girard initiates in his first book, 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel. Here, one finds connections between suggestion and mimetic 
desire that Girard’s later work simply bears no witness to, or actively seeks to conceal it.
Thus, when describing the way in which characters in Gustave Flaubert’s novels 
come to acquire desires, Girard approvingly draws on Jules de Gaultier’s analysis of 
‘bovarysm’. With this term, de Gaultier describes Emma Bovary’s lack of character, which 
makes her ‘fated to obey the suggestion of an external milieu, for lack of an auto-suggestion 
9from within’ (Girard, 1966: 5, emphasis added). From here, Girard generalizes that all of 
Flaubert’s characters are indeed marked by ‘an essential lack of a fixed character and 
originality of their own […] so that being nothing by themselves, they become something, 
one thing or another, through the suggestion which they obey’ (Girard, 1966: 63, emphasis 
added). It is this that sets the stage for the emergence of mimetic desire. According to Girard, 
human beings are animals that desire, but not knowing what to desire, they borrow desire 
from the Other. However, what is Girard’s mimetic desire if not a form of suggestion and a 
concealed acknowledgment of its power? Curiously, Girard comes close to saying so himself 
when describing Don Quixote, stating that ‘behind [his] desires there is indeed suggestion’ 
(Girard, 1966: 5, emphasis added) – yet, this insight is denied further space in his later works.
Despite the obfuscation, it seems clear that suggestion and hypnosis do some of the 
work of mimetic desire. As Jean-Michel Oughourlian has noted, Girard’s description of 
human beings as mimetic creatures whose desires are never authentic, but rather borrowed, 
reduces them to puppets, ‘puppets of desire’ (Oughourlian, 1991). As a psychiatrist himself, 
Oughourlian concedes that this is the result of human being’s susceptibility to suggestion and 
hypnosis. Interestingly, Oughourlian considers the latter as expressions of mimesis and 
mimetic desire – not the other way around. It is clear, however, that in Girard’s triangular 
understanding of desire, the model whose desires are imitated functions as a suggesteur or 
indeed a hypnotist. Further, it is curious to note that although Girard describes in detail the 
experience of the loss of self that mimetic desire generates in the imitator, he never explicitly 
links this to the larger question of hypnosis. To paraphrase Ruth Leys, and in ways that are 
reminiscent of Freud’s own predicaments concerning hypnosis, Girard’s mimetic theory is 
thus ‘an attempt to solve the problem of the hypnotic rapport by transforming suggestion into 
desire’ (Leys, 1993: 283) – and specifically, in the case of Girard, mimetic desire.
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Two further considerations seem important at this stage in order to draw out further 
connections between the ICS literature and mimetic theory. Firstly, the almost exclusive 
focus on the negative properties of mimesis sets mimetic theory aside from other approaches 
to imitation and, as such, needs investigating. Just as Girard is skeptical, in fact overtly 
critical, of the pretensions of the liberal autonomous subject, he is wary of mimesis – 
although celebrating it, through his work he resists and ultimately opposes it. The human 
capacity to imitate is unceremoniously blamed for conflict: because we imitate, we turn 
envious, petty, and violent and from there we lose ourselves in the lynch mob, we become 
‘possessed’ by forces outside of our control. In his examination of the figure of Satan in 
mimetic theory, the Girardian theologian Wolfgang Palaver has recently argued that ‘the 
devil is nothing other than the mimesis’ itself, in its endless cycle of rivalry and vengeance 
(Palaver, 2013: 260). It is hard not to see in Girard’s view of mimesis the echo of an old 
preoccupation with the power of suggestion and of crowd behavior (Borch, 2012: 23). It is 
not by chance that Girard expresses reservations about the principles of popular sovereignty 
and equality on which liberal democracies are founded. Girard’s well-known conservatism 
shines through in his claim that only well-established hierarchies have the power to stop 
process of internal mediation through which mimesis turns violent and contagious. Equality 
is dangerous, just as mimesis is. 
Secondly, the centrality of the scapegoat to the mechanisms of containment of 
violence also deserves a closer look, if only by way of a detour. As Michel Borch-Jacobsen 
has noted, in both Tarde and Freud, the origins of political order are to be found in leaders 
that function as absolute subjects, or hypnotist-leaders (Borch-Jacobsen, 1988: 144; cf. 
Borch, 2012: 52). Leaders are required in order to channel the crowd’s erratic behavior, bring 
order to chaos and establish governance. A leader subjects the crowd in the sense that he/she 
emerges as subject out of the loss of subject, or self, experienced by the crowd. Leaders are 
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involved, in other words, in a process of signification that clearly marks a difference and 
establishes a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. It is not far-fetched to establish a link between this take 
on leaders and Girard’s use of the scapegoat. The scapegoat too emerges as a subject out of 
the indistinction experienced by crowds; the scapegoat too ‘magically’ re-establishes order 
and peace by virtue of its appearance; the scapegoat too is considered by Girard as the origin 
of signification. As a negative image of the leader, the scapegoat comes to symbolize that 
moment of supreme ‘decision’, the diktat that makes horizontal contagion cease by 
establishing a vertical identification believed to resolve the crisis of the self. 
Terrorism and the two sides of mimesis: who is ‘Charlie’?
To sketch the different pictures of imitation that mimetic theory and ICS paint by virtue of 
their divergent conceptual and normative commitments, I shall now turn to a set of events 
that revolve around the twin terror attacks of 7–9 January 2015 in Paris, the so-called ‘Charlie 
Hebdo’ attacks. As Mark Sedgwick (2007) among others has illustrated, terrorism has been 
often considered a particularly mimetic or contagious form of political violence (for a few 
notable contributions in a long-standing debate, see Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida, 
1980; Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; and Braithwaite, 2010). Understood as 
the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through the threat or use of violence in the 
pursuit of political change, terrorism appears also as a quintessentially affective political 
phenomenon, trading in emotions at both ends – in its motivations (rage, resentment) and its 
effects (fear, terror). For these and other reasons, therefore, terrorism represents a particularly 
fruitful area of investigation if approached through the analytical lens of imitation. After a 
brief account of the events of January 2015, in what follows I argue that imitation was central 
to both the violence perpetrated by attackers and the political and affective order that 
emerged around of the attacks. I will further demonstrate, however, that these ‘two sides of 
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imitation’ contain counterintuitive elements which can also be traced back to mimesis, thus 
showing the fundamental ambivalence of the social and political workings of imitation.
At around 11:30 am on 7 January 2015, two brothers in their thirties named Chérif 
and Said Kouachi, French citizens of Algerian descent, burst into number 6 Rue Nicolas-
Appert armed with AK-47s and shouted: ‘Is this Charlie Hebdo?’. After firing a few bullets, 
they left the premises and headed for number 10, the headquarters of the satirical French 
weekly ‘Charlie Hebdo’. Here they broke into the morning editorial meeting of the magazine 
and proceeded to kill 11 people, including the magazine’s Director Stéphane ‘Charb’ 
Charbonnier and other cartoonists as well as staff members. After leaving the scene and 
killing a Muslim police officer named Ahmed Merabet who stood in their way, the two 
brothers escaped in a getaway car, a black Citroën C3 in which jihadist flags and Molotov 
cocktails were later found. The terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
claimed the attacks justifying it as protest for the magazine’s depictions of the Prophet 
Muhammad. On 9 January, with the two gunmen still at large, a 32-year-old friend of the two 
brothers and self-declared member of the Islamic State, Amédy Coulibaly, stormed a 
Hypercacher kosher supermarket in Porte de Vincennes, taking several hostages inside the 
store. While in contact with the Kouachi brothers and as he was recorded by a supermarket 
phone left off the hook, Coulibaly murdered four Jewish hostages and held fifteen other 
hostages. After a long stand-off, both the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly were killed within 
minutes of each other at around 5 pm, when the police blasted the warehouse where the 
brothers were hiding and the supermarket where Coulibaly was barricaded (Vice News, 
2015). 
During the 48 hours of the attacks and in the days that followed, mass demonstrations 
swept the streets of Paris as well as global social media. On the night of the Charlie Hebdo 
attack, spontaneous rallies were held at the Place de la République, gathering thousands of 
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people, many holding up pens and pencils in solidarity with the slain journalists and in 
support of freedom of expression. A few hours after the attacks, French artist Joachim Roncin 
tweeted an image with a black background and the words ‘Je suis Charlie’ – in less than an 
hour the hashtag #jesuischarlie reached 6500 tweets per minute and started trending on 
Twitter; it went on to become one of the most popular news hashtags in the history of 
Twitter, with over six million uses across social media (The Telegraph, 2015). 
Demonstrations spread around the world over the following two days, gathering significant 
crowds, many holding the ‘Je Suis Charlie’ sign. This mass mobilisation climaxed on 11 
January, when the largest public rally in France since World War II was held in Paris under 
the name of ‘rally of national unity’ (marche républicaine). Marching from Place de la 
République to Place de la Nation, a crowd of two million people was led by French President 
Hollande and joined by more than 40 world leaders. A week later, Prime Minister Valls 
introduced a package of ‘exceptional’ anti-terror measures, including new security and 
surveillance measures that were compared to the post 9/11 ‘Patriot Act’ and were further 
consolidated in November, when France declared an on-going ‘state of emergency’ due to 
terrorism (The Guardian, 2015b).
There can be little doubt that issues of imitation, contagion and suggestion were 
central to the response to the Paris terror attacks. Firstly, from the day of the first attack, and 
despite minimal knowledge of events still unfolding, crowds started to aggregate 
spontaneously on the streets of Paris. Through a process of mass mobilization and a 
contagious feeling of solidarity that lasted for days, crowds formed and hit the streets – with 
the Liberation newspaper titling: ‘We are one people’ (Fassin, 2015). That the politics of 
response to the crisis was a politics of crowds became also apparent with the march en masse 
of 11 January, which was called to condemn violence, reassert freedom of expression and 
celebrate national unity. Arguably, this functioned as an effective way for political leadership 
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to harness the power of the crowd and channel contagion, reinscribing the boundaries of the 
existing political and social order. It did not matter, as it was later revealed, that world leaders 
carefully staged their participation in the rally and posed arm in arm only long enough for 
photographs to be taken (The Independent, 2015; Gürsel, 2017); it also did not matter that 
some of the leaders at the front of the march were also at the bottom of global press freedom 
indexes (The Guardian, 2015a), for the march to have its intended effect. However, possibly 
the most evident manifestation of imitation and especially suggestion revolved around the 
slogan-turned-hashtag #jesuischarlie. After all, the solidarity motto functioned linguistically 
as the affirmation of a borrowed subjectivity – something deeply reminiscent of suggestion. 
While the hashtag was spreading contagiously through social media, the ‘Je Suis Charlie’ 
image quickly turned into a meme – and one whose fundamental structure of meaning (‘Je 
Suis’) continues to be applied today to all manner of causes (BBC News, 2016). As 
demonstrated in the literature, the remarkable circulation of #jesuischarlie was due to its 
highly affective content, which the social media amplified and spread by virtue of their own 
imitative structure (Johansson et al., 2018). The hashtag not only served to constitute a global 
community of mourners and thus, create a social space through mimesis. As Burgess, 
Mitchell, and Münch (2018) have recently argued, just as in the case of celebrity deaths, it 
also underpinned a social media ritual as well, with conventions and performances that 
brought together the social and the personal plane. 
If this shows ‘one side’ of mimesis – the social, gregarious behavior it generates – one 
could also read the Paris terror attacks from a different angle and come to much less 
reassuring conclusions as to the effects of imitation and, in particular, its relation to violence. 
A reading of the attacks inspired by mimetic theory and, in particular, mimetic desire, would 
investigate relationship between victims and perpetrators as a form of rivalry (Brighi, 2016). 
Just as mimetic desire is about rivalry, the encounter between Islamic terrorists and the West 
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could be traced back to a logic of rivalry – however, not a rivalry deriving from (cultural, 
religious) differences, but rather a rivalry deriving from identity, especially frustrated 
identity. As Slavoj Zizek (2015) stated at the time of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, ‘the problem 
is not cultural difference and [the terrorists’] effort to preserve their identity, but the opposite 
fact that the fundamentalists are already like us, that, secretly, they have already internalized 
our standards and measure themselves by them’. This is the imitative logic that mimetic 
theory recognizes at the heart of desire and its workings, which is the logic of envy and 
resentment. In this case, this reading would show that the radical openness created by 
globalization, with its inescapable mediatic/mimetic spectacle and its endless reverberations, 
can lead to relentless competitive, rather than cooperative, effects and the potential for the 
rise of disaffection whenever winning or successfully emulating the model becomes 
impossible (Brighi, 2015). The Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly would therefore be further 
examples of mimetic ‘lone-wolves’: radicalized through the internet or in prison, disaffected 
by a failed multiculturalist or integrationist paradigm, combining personal and collective 
resentments regarding the perceived humiliation of Arabs and Muslims, turning violently 
against a model (French society) that systematically precludes them access to what the model 
has, is, or desires (Diallo, 2015). 
If this account is able to reveal the ‘two sides of mimesis’, mirroring each other like 
mimetic doubles, I would argue that it is necessary to complicate the picture further by 
adding another vector through which imitation flows. The ‘social’ and ‘conflictual’ narratives 
of imitation are not mutually exclusive – in fact, I would like to argue that they each contain 
elements of their opposites. 
Thus, for instance, there was a highly conflictual and exclusionary side to the social 
and gregarious manifestations of imitation as witnessed around the Paris attacks. The show of 
solidarity for the victims went hand in hand with an endorsement of ‘freedom of speech’ that 
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soon turned into a form of policing (Fassin, 2015; El-Enany and Keenan, 2015). The voices 
that dared question the absolute status of this principle or denounce its myopic, classist 
defence in French society were side-lined or actively silenced. Islamophobic attacks spiked 
after the attacks, with Muslims targeted with harassment or called out to apologize for the 
attacks on behalf of their religion (Diallo, 2015). If one crosses analytical lenses and applies 
mimetic theory to read social events that ICS literature is naturally placed to explain, 
different information is allowed to emerge. In this case, how forms of scapegoating were 
actively pursued during the aftermath of the attack to secure the ‘body politic’ and social 
order emerged through mimesis – a process further entrenched by the declaration of a ‘state 
of exception’ (Bigo, 2015). The marche républicaine was stigmatized for being 
predominantly white and middle class, while the process of mourning itself became the 
occasion to reinforce hierarchies and exclusions intended to keep the community pure (Cole, 
2015). Thus, the bodies of the dead terrorists were first sent back to Algeria and Mali, 
respectively; they were returned by those states, however, on the ground that those bodies 
were of French citizens; finally, they were buried at night in unmarked graves in the apparent 
attempt to erase any of their traces. In contrast, the body of one of the policemen killed, 
Ahmed Merabet, also Muslim and also of Algerian descent, was symbolically placed at the 
center of state funerals, where he was celebrated as the ‘good Muslim’ who had sacrificed his 
life to defend the France laïque (Balkan, 2016).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the point where imitation and conflict converge, 
we also find unexpected elements of gregariousness and sociality. As Olivier Roy (2016) 
observed in the aftermath of the Paris terror attacks, a very social and mimetic concept is at 
the heart of Islamic terrorism, and that is the concept of brotherhood. Terrorism scholars such 
as Marc Sageman and Scott Atran have argued Islamic terrorism must be investigated less in 
relation to the dogmas of this religion and its leaders and more in relation to the ‘leaderless’, 
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horizontal congeries of networks and ‘bands of brothers’ it consists of (see, for instance, 
Atran, 2010). After all, the Islamic State identifies itself as a group of ‘brothers who have 
refused to live a life of humiliation’ (Al-’Adnani, 2014) – and, of course, as has been the case 
in a few recent terror attacks, Chérif and Said Kouachi were literally brothers (Brighi, 2015). 
Beyond this point, however, as Silke and O’Gorman have recently argued, lies an 
understanding of terrorism as a form of empathetic, altruistic and pro-social behavior that 
rests on imitative behavior. Terrorists generally believe not only to be acting justly but, most 
importantly, to be serving others: ‘a terrorist movement usually presents itself as a self-
declared vanguard representing the interests of the aggrieved’ (O’Gorman and Silke, 2015: 
158). This is perhaps a less comfortable side to analyze, but as Emmanuel Todd argued, the 
terror attacks held up a mirror to French society and forced it to see the degree of resentment 
experienced by some of its citizens due to structural forms of injustice and discrimination 
(Bauman, 2015). Rather than the lack of social and moral concerns, the attacks therefore 
emphasize a commitment to sociality through a different side of imitation.
Conclusion: mimesis, affect, politics
The story of the encounter between affect theory and Girard’s mimetic theory is yet to be 
written. Yet, this encounter appears inevitable in so far as both approaches deal with a 
modality of human interaction that challenges the modern conception of a rational, 
deliberative self. As amply illustrated by the works of Nigel Thrift, Brian Massumi and 
William Connolly, the recent turn to affect has helped foreground the pre-personal, non-
cognitive, non-conscious level at which affective intensities travel and propagate. As 
suggested above, mimetic theory developed out of Girard’s fascination not only with the 
workings of imitation, but with the workings of a particular form of mimesis, the mimesis of 
desire. Two implications follow from this consideration. Firstly, the way in which desire is 
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mirrored in others, travels and propagates irremediably does away with the notion of the 
modern, autonomous, rational self – a conclusion that parallels that endorsed by affect 
theorists. Secondly and perhaps even more importantly, the chapter advanced the argument 
that what lies behind Girard’s concerns with mimetic desire, although never explicitly 
articulated, is a concern about the power of suggestion, and in particular affective suggestion. 
In the last segment of his life and work, Girard experienced a turn interpreted by many as 
apocalyptic (Girard, 1996; 2012). It is not far-fetched to hypothesize that behind Girard’s 
growing concern about today’s escalating mimetic crisis was also a more specific concern 
about the mimetic escalation of affects. 
According to Girard, the mimetic tendencies underpinning globalization have created 
a huge potential for interpersonal relations and exchange, but they have also driven rivalry 
and envy, already normally present in human relations given their inevitably imitative nature, 
out of proportion. The triumph of the very operating principles of liberal and capitalist 
societies – namely, equality and the market, and their competitive effects – are now amplified 
on a global scale and the result is that ‘the whole planet now finds itself, with regard to 
violence, in a situation comparable to that of the most primitive groups of human beings, 
except that this time we are fully aware of it’ (Girard, 1987: 260–1). Immanence and the loss 
of any transcendental points of reference have consigned humanity to give up its normative 
horizons, and to live and fight its battles mimetically which, according to mimetic theory, 
means violently. In resonance with other political theorists, Girard argues that this creates the 
conditions for a contagious wave of negative emotions and for progressively alienated, 
frustrated, and especially resentful, individuals. As argued by Wendy Brown, individuals are 
at once saturated with human power and yet are increasingly alienated from their capacity to 
truly act politically. ‘Starkly accountable, yet dramatically impotent’, the individual ‘quite 
literally seethes with ressentiment’ (Brown, 1993: 402).
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Curiously, Girard’s negative assessment of the contemporary condition echoes some 
of the critiques levied against affect theorists and the implications of a global politics of 
affect. In warning about the danger of misappropriating findings from the neurosciences, 
Ruth Leys has recently cautioned against assuming the primacy of the visceral, corporeal and 
a-signifying dimension of affect. Leys maintains that the anti-intentionalism of affect theory 
inevitably shifts our attention away from questions of meaning, signification and ‘ideology’ – 
all of which can be intersubjectively negotiated and contested through ‘reason’ – towards the 
‘subject’s sub-personal material affective responses, where, it is claimed, political and other 
influences do their real work’ (Leys, 2017: 322). The kind of politics that is envisaged by 
affect theorists is, according to Leys, one not only dangerously incapacitated by an ‘affective 
fallacy’ – i.e., by the error of judging things not for their meaning or truth, but for how they 
make us feel – but also one in which it becomes virtually impossible to adjudicate between 
values, let alone intervene intentionally and politically. We arrive here at a very familiar 
position, which encapsulates Girard’s own struggle against imitation. In Leys’ own words, 
‘what is at stake […] in the struggle against mimesis is the very possibility of a rational, 
democratic politics, which is to say the possibility of a rational, democratic subject’ (Leys 
1993, 301fn62). According to both Girard and Leys, a politics yoked to mimesis and affect – 
which, as the chapter has sought to demonstrate, ultimately dissolve one into the other – is a 
dangerous kind of politics.
In this paper, I have advanced a less stark position on the question of mimesis, 
arguing that there are always ‘two sides to imitation’. Our radical openness to the Other, 
which forms the basis of all phenomena of imitation, suggestion and contagion, has the 
ability to generate social as well as conflictual behavior. The fact that mimetic theory tends to 
be preoccupied predominantly with the latter, while ignoring the literature on ICS and the 
former, is worth investigating. This chapter has advanced a few interpretations as to why this 
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may be so – from Girard’s attempt to conceal the power of suggestion to his fear of the 
‘irrational’ power of mimesis. Be that as it may, the current political conjuncture seems to 
present possibilities and challenges that are worth interrogating from a plurality of angles. 
Indeed, phenomena such as contemporary terrorism testify to the complex patterns of 
sociality and conflict generated in this hyper-mimetic and hyper-mediatized age. 
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